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Vote Counter

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About Vote Counter

One pile of ballot papers, counted six different ways. Every voter ranks all the candidates, best first, and voters who rank them the same way are grouped on one ballot paper: "21 voters: Olive, Jade, Sky...". Change how many voters are in a group, drag the candidates on a paper to reorder them (or focus one and use the arrow keys), add or remove groups, or pick an example. Every count updates at once. Click a result (or press 1 to 6) to see how it was counted.

The MAP tab makes a random electorate instead: voters scattered on a map of opinion, and each voter ranks the candidates from nearest to farthest. Drag a candidate to move them and watch the counts change.

THE SIX COUNTS

THE STORY

The two big ideas are old. Ramon Llull, a Majorcan philosopher, described choosing by pairwise contests in the 13th century, and Nicholas of Cusa described a points system in 1433, but both were forgotten. In France, Jean-Charles de Borda proposed his points count to the Academy of Sciences in 1770 (published 1784), and in 1785 the Marquis de Condorcet argued for head-to-head contests, and noticed that the majority's preferences can go round in a circle. That circle is now called the Condorcet paradox. The alternative vote is usually credited to the American architect William Robert Ware, around 1870. Approval voting got its name in the 1970s and was studied then by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn.

In 1951 the economist Kenneth Arrow proved why no method is perfect. With three or more candidates, no rule that turns voters' rankings into the group's ranking can always meet four fair-sounding conditions together: it works for any rankings voters give; if every voter prefers X to Y, so does the result; the result between X and Y depends only on how voters rank X against Y, not on other candidates; and no single voter is a dictator. Arrow's theorem is about methods that use only rankings, and the third condition is the one that every method here breaks somewhere: a candidate who can't win can still change who does, as the spoiler example shows. Arrow shared the Nobel prize in economics in 1972. Later, Allan Gibbard (1973) and Mark Satterthwaite (1975) showed that every such method with three or more candidates (other than a dictatorship) can sometimes reward voting tactically.

HOW IT WORKS

Ties are rare with real numbers of voters but they happen here. When a rule must order two tied candidates (who is knocked out in the alternative vote, who reaches a runoff), it takes the one who had fewer first choices in an earlier round (alternative vote only), then the lower Borda score, then the one later in the candidate list. The count sheet says when a tie was broken. A tie for the win itself is shown as a tie.

The map is a "spatial model" of voting, after Harold Hotelling (1929) and Anthony Downs (1957). Duncan Black showed in 1948 that if opinions lie along a single line and the number of voters is odd, there is always a Condorcet winner: the candidate nearest the median voter. On a two-way map, cycles become possible, but they are still rare.

The candidates are colours, not parties. The examples are made up, except "Where's the capital?", a textbook example usually told about four cities in Tennessee.

FURTHER WATCHING AND READING

THE BALLOTS

EXAMPLE

CANDIDATES

    THE DECLARATIONS